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2026-02-11 19:27:16 +00:00
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@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ https://www.1000rr.net/threads/k-line-ecu-logging.247922/
- 2016 forum thread "Whipped up a simple circuit to interface with
the K-Line interface found on that red adapter under the seat. "
https://www.carlsalter.com/mcpdf/Honda%20-%20cbr125rw-service-manual.pdf
- wirig diagram, yay. !Caution: this is 2007 model!
pin 1 Bl/W IGP "ignition power" (also seen on DLC)
@@ -169,3 +169,50 @@ O wifi provisioning over ble
- add an IMU to get lean angles
- stop hardcoding BLE address
```
---
We don't think impersonation is a big threat, because it requires
having physical access and the ignition key in order to power on the
device
However, there is the problem that the wifi password is transmitted plaintext
so an attacker could use this to get access to the wifi.
In the current hardware confiudation, BLE pairing won't help, as it is
susceptible to MITM without a display and an input device. While it
is conceivable that there is some input to the ECU we could could
co-opt for saying "yes" or "no" to a displayed PIN, there is nowhere
to display it.
If we add an NFC transceiver we could use OOB pairing. the nfc chip
could be stuck to the inside of the rear tail fairing just next to the
ecu. The need for physical access makes it more secure but also a bit
less convenient for pairing with a bluetooth in the shed when the bike
is parked (e.g. to do ota updates)
how about using the ed25519 key we have for ota/sessionm auth?
1) the device generates a random 32 byte token, then encrypts it using the
client's private ed25519 key and publishes the ciphertext using GATT
2) the client decrypts it and uses it as a key for aes-ccm encrypting the
wifi password
3) the device decrypts that and, if successful, stores the secret
https://docs.espressif.com/projects/rust/esp-hal/1.0.0-beta.0/esp32c3/esp_hal/aes/struct.Aes256.html
this does not seem to expose any aes mode that has both encryption and
message authenticity
https://docs.rs/aes-ccm/latest/aes_ccm/
this is software, but that's ok for what's probably quite a rare operation
without a secon